To say that financial aid is a key component of the college admissions process is an understatement. For the student and her family, financial aid is a way to afford quality post-secondary education that otherwise may have been unobtainable. For the college, financial aid is a method to compete for the best and brightest students. For policymakers, financial aid is a subsidy for educational expenses where constituencies often differ over its merits. This research attempts to analyze the financial aid process by considering the ability of a student to act strategically. A gametheoretic model developed by Epple, Romano, Sarpca, and Sieg (2005) is utilized and evaluated using empirical evidence from the 1996 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS:96). It is shown that a student can maximize her financial aid offer by increasing the number of schools to which she has been accepted after controlling for ability, demographics, state fixed effects and institutional characteristics. A matching estimator to calculate average treatment effects and properly address endogeneity concerns.
Introduction
The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) estimates that 63% of the roughly 17 million undergraduate students in the United States received some type of financial aid in 2004. This research will use data from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) to model the effect of student bargaining power on financial aid received. The financial aid process can be thought of as a bargaining game between the student and the universities to which the student was accepted. Once the student has been accepted to some subset of the universities to which she applied, a new market has been created with the student as the sole buyer in this market and the subset of schools as the sellers.
1 If the student was accepted at only one school, then the student has very little bargaining power in terms of acquiring a good price, which in this market, is represented by a favorable financial aid package. If, on the other hand, the student has been accepted at several colleges, then the student has the ability to bargain with these schools for the best deal possible. In other words, the market changes from looking like a monopoly to looking more like a competitive market. Intuition suggests that students who are accepted at many institutions will have more favorable financial aid packages than those who are accepted only at the institution they are attending.
Most colleges require students seeking financial aid to fill out detailed financial information forms including common, federally-mandated forms as well as college-specific forms. Once these forms have been processed, the school comes up with a financial aid package for the student. This "package" consists of a combination of different types of aid, such as grants, loans, work-study, and other miscellaneous aid.
2 What most families do not completely understand is exactly how this package is determined.
While colleges have a lot of freedom to choose their own financial aid policies, they also have some restrictions on what they can and cannot do. One set of restrictions involves the loan amounts that the school can award its students. 3 Currently, there is a cap on subsidized loans at $2,625 for Freshmen, $3,500 for Sophomores, and $5,500 for Juniors and Seniors, a cap on unsubsidized loans at $4,000 for Freshmen and Sophomores and $5,000 for Juniors and Seniors, and a cap on Perkins 4 loans at $3,000 for all students. In addition, there is an overall limit on total borrowed money that an undergraduate dependent student can have at $23,000. Restrictions on work-study aid are less specific. Students can devote no more than 20 hours per week to this program; however, schools can choose the hourly wage.
Other than these restrictions and safeguards insuring that there is no unfair discrimination in the process, the colleges can choose both the level and composition of the financial aid package. Schools receive a report from the Department of Education that indicates the "expected family contribution" (EFC). This is a figure that measures how much a family can reasonably afford to pay for college, which is calculated based on a complicated formula that includes such things as parent and student assets and income, number of family members in college, etc. This EFC, however, is used by most colleges as a guideline for financial aid, not a rule. Schools generally use their own financial aid forms in conjunction with this government-reported EFC to arrive at the financial aid package offered to their applicants.
As can be imagined, there are often substantial differences in the financial aid offerings from different schools to the same student. A student may, for example, receive an offer of $8,000 in grant aid from one institution, $5,000 in grant aid combined with $2,625 in subsidized loans from a second institution, and $4,000 in grant aid, $2,000 in subsidized loans, and $3,000 in work-study from a third institution. Reasons for these differences may potentially include the disparate methodologies used by these colleges in determining need, gender, race, as well as the variance in financial constraints facing the colleges (i.e., public/private sector, endowment, athletic revenues, etc.). Another reason is that many schools take the quality of the student into account when making these decisions -and their opinions of the student's quality may vary substantially.
As an example of the process, consider the following anecdotal evidence from a selective private college. This school calculates the expected family contribution based on its own formula. This formula is generally yields a more favorable aid package to the student than the government's suggested EFC. Along with this formula, the university then attaches a "quality rating" to the student ranging from A to G based on the student's application for admission. The application contains detailed information including test scores, grades, and extra-curricular activities. Using all of this information, the school then develops the financial aid package for the student. After controlling for assets, income, extenuating financial situations, and other factors in the EFC calculation, a student with a high quality rating will receive more total aid and, in addition, the aid that she is offered consists of a higher proportion of grants than a lower-rated student's aid package. It should be pointed out that this is not an isolated anecdote but rather a fairly typical account of this process.
The process would appear fairly straight-forward if it ended here. However, in many cases, families will negotiate with the colleges in an attempt to acquire a better financial aid offer. This can be accomplished in two ways. First, the families may have additional information that suggests the need for more aid than was offered originally. An example of this might be large medical bills or a change in family structure. The second method used in the bargaining process is forcing the schools to compete with one another. A student may indicate to one school that a second school has offered more aid and ask them to meet or beat this package. This is where the strategic behavior of this process enters. Although many publicly deny it, colleges may engage themselves in this bargaining game with the students. This essay investigates whether or not there is evidence of this game. Going back to our example of the selective private college, its financial aid office has indicated that once a student is accepted for admission, they will do everything within reason to ensure that the student attends. In other words, they will compete for students with other schools. They further indicate that if a student says that he/she will go to another school that is offering a better financial aid package and provide proof, then they will usually meet or beat this price, regardless of the other school in question. Even Harvard University now calls its need-based financial aid policies "competitively supportive" and requests its students to ask Harvard to meet offers of aid from other leading institutions. 5 In the following section, I will attempt to model the financial aid process. In addition, I will test the robustness of the results considering the rank of the second choice school to determine whether any particular school would view all other schools as competitors.
In an attempt to confirm that these negotiations occur in the public sector as well, I contacted financial aid officers at ten randomly selected of public universities.
6 On the condition of anonymity, I relayed the negotiation process suggested above and asked whether their institution entered into similar negotiations with students. Five of these schools indicated that they have recently revised financial aid packages for students that have provided proof of competing offers. Of the remaining five, two indicated that they have done so in the past under a more favorable financial climate.
In the next section, I propose a theoretical model of the financial aid process. Next, descriptive statistics are presented and analyzed with particular attention given to the differences between public and private institutions and the students that they tend to attract. In the 'Results' section, a matching estimator is utilized in order to estimate the treatment effects of multiple acceptances. This methodology allows me to test the theory while controlling for the endogeneity caused by the consideration of a variable (number of acceptances) which to a very large extent can be chosen or, at the very least, manipulated by the students by altering application behavior.
Theoretical Model
Epple, Romano, Sarpca, and Sieg (2005) develop a model of the college application and admission process where students are involved in a bargaining game with a school which consists of sequential moves and asymmetric information. 7 In their paper, the authors indicate that "[m]ost of the previous literature that has analyzed college admission and enrollment decisions… ignores the fact that colleges and potential students often negotiate over the amount of financial aid that is awarded to students."
In their proposed game, a student has income y (which is known by the student and the college), ability v (which is private information for the student), and negotiation costs c. The college observes b = v+ η, which serves as a noisy signal of the student's ability. In the first stage of the game, the college chooses whether or not to accept the student and how much financial aid, if any, to offer the student, based on this noisy signal of student ability. Then, if accepted by the college, the student has three options at this stage:
1.
Choose not to negotiate, and accept the college's offer.
2.
Choose not to negotiate, and reject the college's offer -thereby opting for an outside opportunity. 3.
Choose to negotiate and reveal a competing offer. If this third option is chosen, the college then has the opportunity to make a counter offer to the student which, by assumption, will be no worse for the student than the original offer. The student then has options 1-3 available to him/her once again and the game ends.
Using a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium concept and plausible parameters for the players' objective functions, the authors develop the following testable predictions concerning the counter offers:
I. If the college is competing against a school of equivalent quality, it should meet or slightly exceed the financial aid package of the competing school.
II.
If the college is competing against a school which is lower ranked, it does not need to match offers with the competing school, but may still benefit from increasing the offer somewhat. III.
If the college competing against the school is higher ranked, they would need to exceed the offer by such a large amount that it would most likely no longer yield a positive profit to admit the student.
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In other words, their model predicts that colleges will be most likely increase their original financial aid offer to a student if the competing offer comes from a college that they view as a peer in terms of quality. 9 In order to test their model, the authors used a dataset of almost 9,000 applications to Carnegie Mellon University in 2004. They found that approximately one-fifth of the admitted financial aid applicants negotiated, about two-thirds of these were offered increased financial aid after negotiation, and the average increase in financial aid for these students was approximately 30% above their initial offers.
In this paper, I will use the model constructed by Epple, Romano, Sarpca, and Sieg (2005) and extend it using data for multiple universities. Unfortunately, data restrictions make it impossible to view the negotiation behavior of students nationwide. However, what the data do allow us to observe is the application and acceptance patterns of students. This model of the financial aid process is used to evaluate the effect of increased acceptances on a student's financial aid package. If a student gets accepted into multiple colleges/universities rather than merely one, then that student has gained some bargaining power that will present itself through a more favorable financial aid package. The analysis conducted in Epple, Romano, Sarpca, and Sieg (2005) considers the financial aid offer at Carnegie Mellon and one competing institution. Although single-institution studies have their obvious limitations, this analysis is useful since a student's bargaining power would be most greatly enhanced by the presence of one competitor. The addition of another competitor or several other competitors would be unlikely to have a very large impact on the bargaining power as Carnegie Mellon would generally only consider the most direct and plausible competitor for the student's enrollment decision. The analysis that follows estimates the impact of going from no competitors (one acceptance) to some positive number of competitors (2 or more acceptances). It improves upon previous studies by not solely examining one institution with its potential idiosyncrasies and by appropriately addressing the endogeneity issue created by this expansion to multiple institutions. 8 The intuition behind III lies in the relatively small profit margin due to the relatively competitive nature of the college marketplace. 9 McMillen, Singell, and Waddell (2005) discusses the competition over list and/or net tuition by thinking of schools as competing with those that are geographically close. They find evidence to support their hypothesis that schools compete directly on price.
A Word about Market Structure:
The market structure for higher education in the United States is difficult to analyze. First, the objective function of individual colleges and universities are not at all obvious. Second, the substitutability of colleges from a student's perspective is almost impossible to infer. However, to adequately analyze pricing policies of colleges and universities it is essential to ask: What market structure exists in higher education? This issue is addressed by looking at the degree of price discrimination in this marketplace. By offering different financial aid packages to different students, schools are engaging in some amount of price discrimination. Colleges are in a good position to price discriminate. They have downward-sloping demand curves due to the heterogeneity of colleges and they have the ability to identify the willingness to pay of their customers. For a student who is accepted into only one institution, the market is monopolistic where the college can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the student. If a student is accepted into multiple schools, however, the market changes from looking like a monopoly to looking more like a competitive market, or at least monopolistically competitive.
In May of 1991, the Justice Department reached a settlement with the eight Ivy League universities 10 to end alleged price-fixing for tuition and financial aid. This was a result of a 1989 civil antitrust lawsuit. Although the schools did not admit that they had done anything wrong in the past, they agreed to no longer "collude or conspire" on financial aid. Up until this point, the schools had held annual meetings to exchange financial aid and tuition information. MIT, also named in the lawsuit, did not join in the agreement. 11 In December of 1993, the Justice Department reached a settlement with MIT that allows colleges to exchange limited information concerning financial aid. With this agreement, schools that agree to admit students regardless of finances may discuss financial aid policies but may not compare individual financial aid awards.
12 Although the nine schools that make up the Ivy League and MIT are not nearly representative of all institutions of higher learning in the United States, looking at the results of this case do indicate the incentives inherent in the system. Hoxby (2000) investigates the impact of the Department of Justice settlement and the cessation of these meetings on need-based financial aid policies as well as tuition and tuition revenue. She concludes that the antitrust suit had an impact in the financial aid for the colleges in question "resulting in aid that was less progressive with respect to parents' income and slightly more sensitive to merit." Since 1993, 10 The Ivy League consists of Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, Princeton, Pennsylvania, and Yale Universities. 11 See Seper (1991) . 12 See Stecklow and Bulkeley (1993) and Daly (1993) .
there has been a lot of discussion about 'price-discounting' in higher education. Price-discounting is when colleges give merit-based financial aid to students in an effort to compete with the other schools that the student is considering for admission.
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Data
The model is evaluated using data from the 1995-96 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS 96) . The NPSAS is a nationwide survey of undergraduate students conducted by the U.S. Department of Education. It contains detailed information about the composition and quantity of financial aid received by college students as well as various demographic, financial, and opinion data from the students and their families and institutional information from the college the student is attending. While there are more recent versions of NPSAS available (1999-2000 and 2003-2004) , the survey unfortunately no longer includes information regarding the number of schools to which a student applied or to which a student is accepted for admission. In any form, the data have not been studied extensively by economists interested in human capital investment. Dick and Edlin (1997) completed previous work using the 1993 wave of this data set in which they consider the fact that families who save for college receive less financial aid and that this is essentially an implicit tax. However, they do not take the next step to discuss the impact of this on human capital investment.
For the analysis that follows, the sample was limited to first-time undergraduate college freshmen at four-year institutions. In addition, the institutions must have a Carnegie Classification 14 of Baccalaureate II or higher and the students must have no missing values for the key variables in the analysis. Also, only dependent students were included as independent students make up a very small portion of the data and use much different federal aid formula. This leaves 3623 observations in the analysis.
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Following the notation of Dick and Edlin (1997) and the other literature on this topic, I construct a variable called 'Aid Value' which weights the total value of the financial aid package on the composition of grants and loans. The idea here is that students do not value a one dollar loan the same that they value a one dollar 13 See Gose (2000) , Kane (1999) and McPherson and Schapiro (1998) for a more complete discussion of this price-or tuition-discounting issue. 14 The Carnegie Classification was developed by Clark Kerr in 1970, primarily to improve the precision of the Carnegie Commission's research. Included in the chosen categories are all doctoral, master, and bachelor degree-granting institutions. 15 While NPSAS (96) does have over 48,000 observations, once the sample is limited to Freshmen (50% of the data), at a four-year bachelor-degree granting institution (64% of the data), and where this is a response for the key "number of acceptances" variable (25% of the data), the number of observations diminishes quickly.
grant. This is due to the fact that at some point, the loan needs to be paid back. The loan is worth something to the student, however, since the student generally is thought to have a discount rate that is significantly higher than the interest rate of the loan, which is generally subsidized. Work-study and other aid do not enter into this measure of Aid Value since a student must give up time and effort to obtain this aid. In addition, work-study and other aid are generally the smallest components of the overall financial aid package. Therefore, the Aid Value variable is a good proxy for the value of the financial aid package to the student. The following measure will be used:
The coefficient of .5 on the total loan aid is dependent on the current interest rate for loans as well as the estimated discount rate that college students use. 16 In this paper, the .5 value is obtained by calculating the present value of the loan to a student borrowing the maximum loan amounts at various discount rates. At a discount rate of 9 percent, a one dollar loan is worth 47 cents; at a discount rate of 10 percent, it is worth 48 cents; and at a discount rate of 12 percent, the one dollar loan is worth 51 cents. Since the actual discount rate is unknown, .5 is a fairly plausible estimate. In the results that follow, the .5 value is used in all calculations of aid value. However, the statistical significance of the results in these regressions holds consistent for all values from 0 to 1.
Descriptive statistics of the data used can be found in Table 1 . 16 The value of .5 used in this paper is the same that is used in McPherson and Schapiro (1991) , Edlin (1993) , Dick and Edlin (1997) , and Bosworth, Carron, and Rhyne (1987) . In Bosworth, Carron, and Rhyne (1987) , this figure is found by calculating the subsidy costs of a student loan at various discount rates and indicating that this is the value of the loan to the student. Feldstein (1995) claims that the coefficient should be about .6 but bases this figure solely on intuition. In Avery and Hoxby (2003) , the authors find that high ability students empirically behave in a manner suggesting that they value an additional value of loan aid almost equivalently to an additional dollar of grant aid. This is found to be less true for students whose parents or siblings attend or attended selective colleges suggesting a learning process here. Note that all means are weighted appropriately as specified by the guidelines of the NPSAS 96 Methodology Report issued by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), including adjustments for design effects. 18 More than half (55%) of the sampled students are female and the vast majority attends on a fulltime (91%) basis. Roughly three-fourths of the students in the sample are the only member of their family in college. As for the variables of particular importance to the analysis, on average, students were accepted to three (3.05) schools.
19 About one-quarter (26%) of the students were only accepted at the one school that they are attending. 19% were accepted at five or more schools. The average student receives almost $6,900 per year in total financial aid, over half (57%) of which is grant aid and nearly a third (30%) of which is student loans. For the remainder of this study, 'total aid' shall be defined as the sum of grant aid, loan aid, work-study, and other aid (i.e. PLUS loans, etc.).
The financial aid offices at private colleges and universities operate in a very different manner than their public counterparts. State governments do not directly subsidize private schools. This is very different from the public schools that are heavily subsidized and can, therefore, offer lower tuition. Table 2 looks at these differences between these two sectors by comparing the means of the relevant variables. Private schools charge higher tuition, give more aid, and have fewer students than their public school counterparts. In addition, they attract wealthier students from a wider geographic area with higher SAT 21 and enroll fewer students. There is substantial variation in the composition of the financial aid that public and private colleges award. Private schools give a higher proportion of grants than public schools (60% vs. .53%).
Results
As suggested earlier, the endogeneity concerns caused by considering number of acceptances make the causal interpretation of traditional linear regression results impossible. Nevertheless, Table 3 presents weighted 22 OLS regressions in a first 20 With the exception of 'Age', 'Female', '2+ College Sibs', and '3 Acceptances', all differences between private and public schools are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. 21 And higher ACT scores as well. 22 The regressions must be weighted appropriately to account for the non-randomness of the subsample used in this analysis. The appropriate weights were obtained courtesy of the National attempt to evaluate the relationship between the number of acceptances and financial aid received. The first specification regresses 'total aid' on institutional characteristics (Carnegie classification, whether the college is private or public, and enrollment size) 23 and student characteristics (SAT score, GPA, parent's income, fulltime status, number of siblings in college, whether or not the student lives in the state where the college is located, race, gender, age, and number of acceptances). In addition, state fixed effects were included to account for the very different set of choices that students face in their application decisions as well as the disparate financial aid rules and regulations across states. The second specification in Table 3 uses 'Aid Value' as the dependent variable as opposed to 'Total Aid' 24 .
Center for Educational Statistics. It should be noted that the sign and statistical significance of coefficients were not affected by using unweighted OLS during checks for robustness. 23 It is important to consider the bias caused by omitting tuition from the regression equation. Certainly schools that charge higher tuition offer more average financial aid. Nonetheless, tuition has been omitted from the regressions in order to see the partial effects of the school characteristics on the total aid. Due to severe multicollinearity concerns, we cannot include tuition as an independent variable along with Private/Public status and enrollment size. However, in specifications replacing the institutional characteristics with tuition, the coefficient on the '2 or more acceptances' remains positive and significant. 24 See Data section earlier in the paper for more information regarding this variable. Robustness checks were also performed by using other variables (total grants, total institutional aid, etc.) in place of 'Aid Value" with very predictably similar results. In the first specification, all coefficients were found to be significant at the .05 level with the exception of 'enrollment size'. Notice that for every additional $1,000 in parental income, the total aid awarded to the student decreases by approximately $30. Also, we find that for every additional 100 points on the SAT, the student receives $241 more in financial aid 26 . Of particular interest to this paper is the significance and sign of the coefficient on the '2 or more acceptances' variable. The coefficient is positive (807.21) and significant suggesting a substantial increase in total financial aid awarded to a student with multiple acceptances compared to merely one. The results from the second specification are qualitatively identical to the first. While the magnitudes of the coefficients have changed, all variables previously identified as significant remain significant. '2 or more acceptances' remains a positive and significant factor in determining financial aid.
Unfortunately, the number of acceptances is almost certainly an endogenous variable (creating results that can't be interpreted as a causal relationship) as well as correlated with student ability (thereby creating bias in the results). To properly account for this endogeneity and correlation, average treatment effects were estimated using a matching estimator. By using this nonparametric estimate of the impact of multiple acceptances on total aid, we are able to compare students who are similar in observables as well as unobservables.
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Matching on the number of applications as well as other variables should substantially lessen the endogeneity concerns in this analysis. Students do get to choose the number of applications they submit (as well as the set of schools to which they apply) but, given this choice, students cannot choose the number of acceptances from this set. Therefore, by properly matching students by the number of applications, the remaining variation in the number of acceptances is essentially exogenous within matched students. Table 4 presents the average treatment effects (on Total Aid as well as Aid Value) that result from the matching estimator technique. In each case, observations are matched with the four 28 most similar observations using the following variables: number of applications, SAT, GPA, parental income, fulltime/part-time status, number of siblings in college, Carnegie classification, private/public status, enrollment size, and state of residence. The results from the matching estimators also support the predictions of the theoretic model. 27 For a full description of the matching estimator and its benefits, see Abadie and Imbens (2006) , Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2001) and Imbens (2004) . 28 Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2001) suggests that, in many cases, four matches would be optimal. In each of the first five specifications, the treatment effects were found to be positive and significant indicating an increase in financial aid after controlling for the aforementioned matching variables. In particular, across the full sample, a student's acceptance to a second college results in approximately $729 more (10.6%) in total financial aid (or roughly $607 in Aid Value). Table 4 also disaggregates these results by sector. The results indicate that the average treatment effect of multiple acceptances remains positive and significant across both public and private institutions. However, the magnitude is systematically higher for private schools ($962.16) than for public schools ($673.81 ). This result is almost certainly due in part to the limited ability that many public colleges and universities may have to participate in this bargaining game on account of scarce financial resources compared to their private counterparts.
The results have shown a consistent increase in financial aid when a student goes from one acceptance to more than one acceptance. This margin should coincide with the most substantial jump in a student's bargaining power since the student is going from a take-it-or-leave-it position with one school to an opportunity to have schools compete for his/her enrollment. There are two 29 * denotes coefficient is significant with α = .05. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Matching estimators were calculated using the technique outlined in Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2001) with 4 matches using the following variables as matching variables: number of applications, SAT, GPA, parental income, fulltime status, siblings in college, Carnegie classification, private/public status, enrollment size, and state of residence. Complete data and results are available from the author.
confounding issues when considering this margin. The first is the prevalence of colleges offering Early Decision programs where students agree to apply to only that single institution in exchange for a shorter wait for the admission decision and, in many cases, a higher likelihood of acceptance. 30 Since neither the choice to offer this type of program nor the decision to apply to an Early Decision program are exogenous or independent of other key variables in the study, inclusion of these students could bias the results. The second related concern is that students may choose to apply to one local institution. Students merely interested in their local college are not truly players in this bargaining game in the same sense that their counterparts are. This could lead to a bias similar to the one caused by inclusion of Early Decision program participants. Unfortunately, NPSAS does not have any variable that indicates student participation in Early Decision programs or a variable on specific student location (other than state of residence). In order to account for these issues, Table 4 displays results of the sub-sample which eliminates individuals who applied to exactly one institution in their state of residence ("local only") as well as individuals who applied to exactly one institution that operated an Early Decision program in 1996 ("ED apps"). The elimination of these individuals increased the magnitude of the '2 or more acceptances' coefficient substantially and maintained its statistical significance.
The remaining two specifications in Table 4 address the concerns presented in the introduction that colleges may choose not to enter into a bidding war against substantially lower-ranked schools. If it is unlikely that a student would choose some particular low-ranked school over the first-choice school, then why would the first-choice school compete with this school? The NPSAS data does not specifically rank the schools to which a student applies. Rather, they simply list the colleges to which a student sends the federal financial aid information. Using the US News and World Report's ranking for 1996, I have then defined the second-choice college to be the highest ranked college receiving financial information about the student that the student does not attend. In the first of these two specifications, the sample in the regression consists of those students whose second-choice college is ranked no worse than 10 positions below the school attended. These schools can be thought of as 'competitors' by the actual school attended.
31 This is to be compared directly to the last specification which consists of students whose second-choice school is at least 11 places lower on the US News and World Report rankings. In the competitive case, the 30 For more information on the effects of Early Decision programs, see Avery, Fairbanks, and Zeckhauser (2001) . 31 Similar results were obtained with variations on this measure of competitive schools including: 1. other distances from US News rank, 2. colleges with a mean SAT score within one standard deviation, and 3. colleges in the same selectivity category as determined by Barron's Profiles of American Colleges. coefficient on '2 or more acceptances' remains positive and significant ($1083.53) while for the non-competitive case, this coefficient is no longer significant. This confirms the predictions of Epple, Romano, Sarpca, and Sieg (2005) that colleges will only competitively bid against those schools that are viewed as a plausible threat to enroll the desired student, i.e., peer institutions.
The analysis shown thus far has focused on the impact of going from one to more than one acceptance on financial aid. If this is the result of an increase in bargaining power, the largest gain in financial aid surely must come from the second acceptance. It is this second acceptance that gives the student the opportunity to enter into the bargaining process. Table 5 identifies the additional aid awarded for individuals meeting the stated condition compared to the alternative. For example, the benefit of receiving 4 or more acceptances is approximately $845 compared to the alternative of having 3 or fewer acceptances. The results suggest that the second acceptance might not be the only additional acceptance that leads to higher financial aid. The increases suggest that perhaps the third and fourth acceptance are as or possibly even more beneficial to the student than the second in terms of additional financial aid. These results do suggest that the number of acceptances above and beyond the second acceptance, is important to consider in the analysis of financial aid.
32 * denotes coefficient is significant with α = .05. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Matching estimators were calculated using the technique outlined in Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens (2001) with 4 matches using the following variables as matching variables: number of applications, SAT, GPA, parental income, fulltime status, siblings in college, Carnegie classification, private/public status, enrollment size, and state of residence.
Conclusions
Although the results of this paper are supportive of the implications of Epple, Romano, Sarpca, and Sieg (2005) that an increase in acceptances increases the financial aid for the student, they go beyond this in several important dimensions.
In particular, even after controlling for ability, income, demographics, location, various school characteristics, and potential endogeneity concerns, the results illustrate that a student with two or more acceptances will have more bargaining power in the financial aid process which will lead to more total financial aid. These results suggest that the financial aid process is one that needs to be analyzed not merely from the strategic perspective of the college, but also from the student's strategic perspective. 33 A student and her family have the ability to place themselves in a more advantageous position by acting strategically in this process. There is significant information asymmetry when it comes to players in the financial aid bargaining game. The colleges have professionals who specialize in strategic financial aid over thousands of students and many years while the student's family many times has no other observations from which to learn. On the other hand, colleges lack precise information regarding an individual student's ability and likelihood of matriculation. This places students and their families in a position to strategically provide the portions of this information that may attract more financial aid and to withhold those portions that do not.
